Based on the Cournot oligopoly game and the nonlinear dynamics theory, we study the behavior of semi-public enterprises by considering corporate social responsibility into their objectives. The model that is established is a dynamical Cournot-type duopoly model with bounded rationality containing the consumer surplus. We suppose quadratic cost function and a convex, log-linear demand function. The game is modeled with a system of two difference equations. Existence and stability of equilibriums of this system are studied. More complex chaotic and unpredictable trajectories are resulted studying this discrete dynamical system. The complex dynamics of the system are demonstrated numerically via computing Lyapunov numbers, sensitivity dependence on initial conditions, and bifurcation diagrams.
EBEEC 2019 compute his expected output is considered. Each player adjusts his outputs towards the profit maximizing amount as target by using his expectations rule. Some authors considered duopolies with homogeneous expectations and found a variety of complex dynamics in their games, such as appearance of strange attractors (Agiza [1] , Agiza et al. [4] , Agliari et al., [5] , [6] , Bischi, Kopel [10] , Kopel [20] , Puu [25] , Sarafopoulos, [27] ).
Also models with heterogeneous agents were studied (Agiza, Elsadany [2] , [3] , Agiza et al. [4] , Den Haan [14] , Fanti, Gori [17] , Tramontana [29] , Zhang [32] ).
In the real market producers do not know the entire demand function, though it is possible that they have a perfect knowledge of technology, represented by the cost function. Hence, it is more likely that firms employ some local estimate of the demand.
This issue has been previously analyzed by Baumol and Quandt [9] , Puu [24] , Naimzada and Ricchiuti [22] , Askar [7] , Askar [8] . Efforts have been made to model bounded rationality to different economic areas: oligopoly games (Agiza, Elsadany [3] , Bischi et al [12] , Zhang et al. [32] ); financial markets (Hommes [19] ); macroeconomic model such as multiplier-accelerator framework (Westerhoff [30] ). In particular, difference equations have been employed extensively to represent these economic phenomenona (Elaydi [15] , Sedaghat [28] ). Bounded rational players (firms) update their production strategies based on discrete time periods and by using a local estimate of the marginal profit. With such a local adjustment mechanism, the players are not requested to have a complete knowledge of the demand and the cost functions (Agiza, Elsadany [2] , Naimzada, Sbragia [23] , Zhang et al [31] , Askar [8] ). All they need to know is if the market responses to small production changes by an estimate of the marginal profit.
All of the above discussions are mainly based on private enterprises, which pursuit the maximization of their own profits. However, there are many firms with different ownership structures. A publicly-owned firm tends to maximize the social welfare, a partially publicly-owned firms tend to maximize the weighted average of the social welfare and its own profit. (Elsadany, Awad [16] ).
The present study is a partial theoretical approach to our main ongoing research objective, which is to quantify and study an oligopoly of the Greek market and extends Askar [8] and Sarafopoulos [27] . We investigate the dynamics of a nonlinear discretetime duopoly game, where the players are bounded rational and they have homogeneous expectations. We assume that the two bounded rational players not only pursue profit maximization but also take consumer surplus into account, so the utilities of both players are the combination of their profits and the consumer surplus. Existence and stability of equilibrium of this system are studied. We show that the model gives more complex chaotic and unpredictable trajectories as a consequence of change in 
The Game

The construction of the game
In oligopoly game players can choose simple extension rules such as naïve or complicated as adaptive expectations and bounded rationality. The players can use the same strategy (homogeneous expectations) or can use different strategy (heterogeneous expectations). In this study we consider homogeneous players such that each player thinks with the same strategy to maximize his output (bounded rational player). Let us consider a market where two firms produce homogeneous commodities. Production decisions are taken at discrete time periods (t = 0, 1, 2, …) We consider a simple Cournottype duopoly market where firms (players) produce the same good and offer them at discrete-time periods on a common market. At each period t, every firm must form an expectation of the rival's output in the next time period in order to determine the corresponding profit-maximization quantities for period t+1. The different technique in this study is that both players' utility function contains a percentage of the consumer surplus. We suppose that 1 , 2 are the production quantities of each firm, then the inverse demand function (as a function of quantities) is given by the following equation:
where is the price of their product and is a positive parameter which expresses the market size. So, for the two players it means that the direct demand function is exponential:
Thus it is convex and log-linear in the price. A function is log-linear if and only if its logarithm is linear. The marketing interpretation of log-linearity is that the rate of growth of the quantity is constant. We suppose that the cost functions of the players are quadratic:
With these assumptions the profits of the firms are given by the following equations:
and
Then, their marginal profits at the point of the strategy space are given by:
As it is noticed above the players of this game not only pursue their own profits but also take corporate social responsibility into account. Some empirical studies have shown how introducing corporate social responsibility affects firm's performance, where we interpret the corporate social responsibility as either consumer surplus CS or social welfare SW. In this game we take account of the CS. Now, the CS can be written as: As it is said above, each player cares about the maximization of a utility function that contains his profit function and a percentage of the consumer surplus. This utility function is described by the following equation:
where ∈ [0, 1] is the percentage of the CS is taken into account by the player i. So, for the players of this game it means that:
Also, the marginal utilities are given by the following equations:
And
Both players follow the same strategy to decide their production quantities (homogeneous players) and they are characterized as bounded rational players. According to the existing literature it means that they decide their productions following a mechanism that is described by the equation: Through this mechanism each player increases his level of adaptation when his marginal utility is positive or decreases his level when his marginal utility is negative, where k is the speed of adjustment of two players, it is a positive parameter (k > 0), which gives the extend variation production of the firm i following a given utility signal.
The dynamical system of the players is described by:
We investigate the effect of the parameter k (speed of adjustment) and the parameter on the dynamics of this system.
Dynamical analysis 2.2.1. The equilibriums of the game
The equilibrium positions are the nonnegative solutions of the algebraic system:
which obtained by setting: 1 ( + 1) = 1 ( ) = * 1 and 2 ( + 1) = 2 ( ) = * 2 in the dynamical system of Eq (13) .
• If * 1 = * 2 = 0 , then the equilibrium position 0 = (0, 0) is rejected because 1 + 2 > 0.
• If * 1 = 0 and 2 2 = 0 , then:
We consider the function: 
Now, form Eq.(18) with * 1 = * 2 = * we obtain: 
Stability of equilibriums
To study the stability of game's equilibriums, the Jacobian matrix is used. The Jacobian matrix ( 1 , 2 ) along the variable strategy ( 1 , 2) is:
where:
The Jacobian matrix becomes: 
For the 1 the Jacobian matrix is:
From the characteristic equation of ( 1) , we find two eigenvalues: it's clearly seems that | 1| > 1 and the 1 equilibrium is unstable.
For the 2 the Jacobian matrix becomes:
From the characteristic equation of ( 2) , we find two eigenvalues: For the * the Jacobian matrix becomes:
From the characteristic equation of ( * ) we find two eigenvalues:
The * is locally asymptotically stable if:
Taking | 1| < 1 the first stability condition is given by:
and taking | 2| < 1 we have the second stability condition which is given by:
As it seems the stability condition of Eq.(25) is the strongest one and this is the total stability condition for the Nash equilibrium * . 
Proposition:
The Nash equilibrium of the discrete dynamical system Eq. (13) is locally asymptotically
Numerical Simulations
Focusing on the parameter k (speed of adjustment)
In this section we present various numerical results focusing on the parameter k, including bifurcation diagrams, Lyapunov numbers and sensitive dependence on initial conditions (Kulenovic, M. and Merino, O. [21] ). For this reason we choose to set some fixed values to other parameters as: = 5, c = 1, b = 2 and = 0.2. By the bifurcation diagrams of the parameter k against the variables * 1 and * 2 that are shown in Fig.1 is clear that the equilibrium undergoes a flip bifurcation at = 0.54. Then a further increase in speed of adjustment implies that a stable two-period cycle emerges for 0.54 < < 0.66. As long as the parameter k reduces a four-period cycle, cycles of highly periodicity and a cascade of flip bifurcations that ultimately lead to unpredictable (chaotic) motions are observed when k is larger than 0.69. Another characteristic of deterministic chaos is the sensitivity dependence on initial conditions. In order to show the sensitivity dependence on initial conditions of the system Eq.(13), we have computed two orbits with initial points (0.1,0.1) and (0.101,0.1) respectively. Figure 3 shows the sensitivity dependence on initial conditions for 1 − coordinate of the two orbits, for the system Eq. 
Focusing on the parameter (CS parameter)
The most interesting parameter of this game is the parameter which reveals the values of the parameters = 5, = 1, = 2and = 0.7 a complexity appears for low values of the parameter . The Nash equilibrium of the system Eq. (13) is under stability when the parameter takes values greater than 0.48. Also the differentiation with other studies is that the equilibrium ( * , * ) is not a fixed point when the parameter is moving into its stability region but it is changing and more specifically the larger the value of , the larger the values of * is taken for the Nash equilibrium. These results are shown by the bifurcation diagrams of Fig.4 and the chaotic behavior of the system Eq.(13) for = 5, = 1, = 2, = 0.7 and = 0.15(outside the stability space) is visualized with the Lyapunov numbers of Fig.5 . Also, this chaotic behavior has the characteristic sensitivity of this system on its initial conditions for the same values of these parameters (Fig.6 ). 
Conclusions
The present paper is a partial theoretical approach to our main ongoing research objective, which is to quantify and study an oligopoly of the Greek market. We analyzed through a discrete dynamical system the dynamics of a nonlinear discrete-time duopoly game with a convex and log-linear demand and quadratic cost functions. We suppose that the players not only pursue profit maximization but also take consumer surplus into account. The stability of equilibria, bifurcation and chaotic behavior are investigated.
We showed that the speed of adjustment (k) and the parameter of social sensitivity ( ) may change the stability of equilibrium and cause a structure to behave chaotically. For low values of k or for high values of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is stable. Increasing (decreasing) these values, the equilibrium becomes unstable, through period doubling bifurcation.
